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Abstract 
Transformative AI technologies have the potential to reshape critical aspects of 
society in the near future. In order to properly prepare policy initiatives for the 
arrival of such technologies accurate forecasts and timelines are necessary. A 
survey was administered to attendees of three AI conferences in 2018 (ICML, 
IJCAI and the HLAI conference). The survey included calibration questions, 
questions for estimating AI capabilities over the next decade, questions for 
forecasting five scenarios of transformative AI and questions concerning the impact 
of computational resources in AI research. Respondents indicated a median of 
21.5% of human tasks (i.e., all tasks that humans are currently paid to do) can be 
feasibly automated now, and that this figure would rise to 40% in 5 years and 60% 
in 10 years. Median forecasts indicated a 50% probability of AI systems being 
capable of automating 90% of current human tasks in 25 years and 99% of current 
human tasks in 50 years. The conference of attendance was found to have a 
statistically significant impact on all forecasts, with attendees of HLAI providing 
more optimistic timelines with less uncertainty. These findings suggest that AI 
experts expect major advances in AI technology to continue over the next decade. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Forecasting human-level machine intelligence has been a topic of interest since as early as 1972, 
when Michie polled participants of a lecture series at the University College of London. The 
majority of respondents indicated that something akin to human-level machine intelligence would 
take 50 years or greater to realize (Michie 1973). However, it was not until recently that the topic 
began to gain serious consideration by academic researchers. Eleven more surveys have been 
administered since 2006 (Grace 2015, Zhang and Dafoe 2019), four of which were ultimately 
reported in academic outlets (Baum, Goertzel et al. 2011, Müller and Bostrom 2016, Grace, 
Salvatier et al. 2018, Walsh 2018). 
Baum et al. conducted a survey at the 2nd Conference on Artificial General Intelligence in 2009 
(Baum, Goertzel et al. 2011). This study involved only 21 participants. The majority of these 
experts expected human-level artificial intelligence (HLAI) to be developed in the coming 
decades, and the researchers concluded that the possibility of developing HLAI in the relative near-
term should be given serious consideration. Despite the low sample size, the study was able to 
assess participants’ opinions further through targeted follow-up questions emailed after the initial 
survey. 18 of the 21 participants completed these follow-up questions. This qualitative element of 
the survey enabled the researchers to explore questions regarding the impact of artificial general 
intelligence (AGI).  
In 2012 Müller and Bostrom conducted a survey that consisted of experts from four different 
samples (Müller and Bostrom 2016). These samples included the top 100 authors in artificial 
intelligence by number of citations, the members of the Greek Association for Artificial 
Intelligence, participants of the 2011 Philosophy and Theory of AI conference, participants of the 
5th Conference on Artificial General Intelligence and participants of the AGI Impacts 2012 
conference. They collected a total of 170 responses, over 40% of which were accounted for by the 
AGI groups. This study elicited expert opinion in the form of probability distributions, however, 
only descriptive statistics were used in the analysis. The median response for 50% probability of 
high-level machine intelligence (HLMI) was 2040, with the AGI groups having the shortest 
responses. Experts further expect that once HLMI has been achieved, systems will move toward 
superintelligence1 within 30 years. 
Walsh also conducted a survey of AI experts whose participants were comprised of three groups: 
1) authors of the 2015 annual conference for the Association for the Advancement of Artificial 
Intelligence and authors of the 2011 International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence; 2) 
fellows of the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers and authors of the 2016 
International Conference on Robotics and Automation; 3) online readers of an article on an AI 
system, Libratus, that defeated professionals in the card game of poker. The responses were 200, 
101 and 548 for each of the groups, respectively. This survey primarily concerned with the risks 
of occupations being automated. However, it did include one question regarding when computers 
may reach HLMI. Experts predicted a significant number of occupations to be at risk of automation 
over the next two decades but were more cautious than non-experts. Probability distributions were 
elicited for the HLMI question, and results were depicted as cumulative distribution functions 
visually. Medians for the 50% probability of HLMI were reported for each of the groups with 2065 
and 2061 for the first two groups. The last group, i.e. non-experts, gave a median value starkly 
lower of 2039.  
Grace et al. conducted a widely discussed survey in 2016 which surveyed authors from the 2015 
Neural Information Processing Systems conference and authors of the 2015 International 
Conference on Machine Learning. The survey received 352 responses. This study elicited expert 
opinion as probability distributions and treated the data accordingly in analysis2. This study had 
some interesting results. For one, the study evaluated framing effects by questioning half of the 
participants for fixed probabilities and half of the participants in fixed years. There was thought to 
be a difference in forecasts based on framing, however, it was ambiguous as to which framing was 
more accurate and there was no statistical analysis to support this conclusion. The combined 
forecasts were reported and the median 50% probability for the development of HLMI was 45 
years. In addition to the HLMI question, a question was asked about when AI will outperform 
humans at all jobs. While worded to be logically equivalent to the HLMI question, the median 
50% probability for this question was 120 years. 
                                               
1 Superintelligence refers to a recursively self-improving HLMI (Bostrom 2014). 
2 This study does the same, and improves slightly on the technique used by Grace et al. in using a multivariate model. 
This is discussed further in the following pages.  
The primary concept of interest in this survey is transformative AI3. For the purposes of this study 
we define transformative AI to be AI that significantly transforms society by replacing humans for 
a large portion (i.e., 50% or greater) of economically useful work. As such, transformative AI 
would include notions of AGI, HLMI, human-level machine intelligence, human-level artificial 
intelligence (HLAI) and machine superintelligence4, as well as narrow AI technologies that also 
meet this definition. Furthermore, the concept of transformative AI described here is also 
consistent with Drexler’s comprehensive AI services (CAIS) model (Drexler 2019). Given the 
definition used here, there is substantial ambiguity regarding transformative AI that poses a 
challenge in forecasting. In order to counter this challenge, questions are asked regarding a number 
of scenarios for transformative AI. To this end, we create a distinction between narrow AI and 
broadly capable AI systems. Narrow AI systems are systems created specifically for a unique task 
or class of tasks. A broadly capable system refers to a single algorithm that can be used to achieve 
a wide variety of tasks. Narrow systems can be thought to comprise the transformative AI systems 
described by CAIS. Broadly capable systems would include transformative AI systems as they 
approach the previously described notions of AGI.  
 
2. Methods 
This paper details the results of a survey administered at three AI conferences over the summer of 
20185; the International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), the International Joint 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) and the Joint Multi-Conference on Human-Level 
Artificial Intelligence (HLAI). ICML and IJCAI were held consecutively in Stockholm, Sweden 
from July 10th-19th. HLAI was held in Prague, Czech Republic from August 21st-25th. HLAI 
included the annual Artificial General Intelligence Conference, the annual Biologically Inspired 
Cognitive Architectures Conference and the annual Workshop on Neural-Symbolic Learning and 
Reasoning. 
Attendees of these conferences were selected at random and asked to participate in the survey. 
Agreeable participants were sent an invite link via email to complete the survey. Participants were 
sent two reminder emails if they had not yet completed the survey. 406 email addresses were 
collected; 286 from ICML/IJCAI and 120 from HLAI. Of these, 203 responses were received, 164 
of which were completed in full; 119 from ICML/IJCAI and 45 from HLAI. The overall 
completion rate was 40.4%. The completion rate for ICML/IJCAI was 37.5% while completion 
rate for the HLAI conference was 50.6%. 
Questions 
The survey6 was comprised of eight content questions, four calibration questions and four general 
questions (i.e., first name, last name, employer and job title). There were four calibration questions, 
each of which asked for a probability that a certain near-term probable AI milestone would occur. 
The content questions were refined through interviews with machine learning experts. The first six 
concerned the use of AI to complete tasks that humans are currently paid to do. These questions 
were split into four pages. Each of these pages included specific instructions, including definitions, 
                                               
3 There is no consensus yet in the AI strategy community as to what level of societal transformation should be used 
the threshold for transformative AI. 
4 For the remainder of the document we will refer to all such notions of intelligent systems as notions of AGI. 
5 The survey is part of a broader, mixed-methods study including expert interviews. Work on this is forthcoming.  
6 The survey can be taken at https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/2018_AI_survey.  
for the questions shown on the page. The final two questions concerned the relationship between 
computational resources and progress in AI research and were shown on the same page. This page 
included a figure and specific instructions. Comment7 boxes were made available for all content 
question pages. 
The four calibration questions were included in order to assess experts’ aptitude for forecasting. 
To do this we asked four questions about the probability of AI milestones that could plausibly 
occur within the next three years. Two of the questions concerned the availability of level four and 
level five autonomous vehicles by the end of 2019 and 2021, respectively, a question about the 
quality of DeepMind’s milestones and a final question which was a very near-term question and 
different for each of the two locations where the survey was solicited. In the first location 
participants were asked about the probability of OpenAI beating a human professional team in the 
multiplayer game Dota 2 and in the second location participants were asked about the probability 
of deep fakes being used to affect the upcoming American elections. 
The first six content questions were dependent on the definition of human tasks. We define human 
tasks as all unique tasks that humans are currently paid to do. We differentiate human tasks from 
jobs in that jobs are comprised of human tasks. For example, an AI system(s) may not replace a 
lawyer entirely but may be able to accomplish 50% of the tasks a lawyer typically performs. The 
first of these six questions asked respondents to estimate the percentage of human tasks feasible 
for being completed by AI systems at fixed years (i.e., at present, in five years and in ten years). 
The remaining of these questions asked for forecasts concerning completion of human tasks in 
number of years at probabilities of 10%, 50% and 90% for five different transformative AI 
scenarios. This format enabled fitting a probability distribution for each respondent’s forecast. 
Although we were interested in transformative AI, we did not use the term in the survey. Nor did 
we use any terms associated with notions of AGI. Rather, we asked for forecasts of AI systems 
capable of completing a percentage of human tasks at or above the level of a typical human. We 
asked participants for forecasts of both narrow AI systems and broadly capable AI systems. For 
forecasts concerning what we consider as narrow AI systems, we simply asked for forecasts of 
when it would be feasible for AI systems to collectively be able to accomplish the given percentage 
of human tasks at or above the level of a typical human. We asked for forecasts of narrow AI 
systems capable of completing 50%, 90% and 99% of human tasks and for forecasts of broadly 
capable AI systems capable of completing 90% and 99% of such tasks8. These were asked of 
respondents on three pages, with questions being grouped by common percentage and ascending 
from 50% to 99%.  
The final two questions concerned forecasting trends in AI computation and the impact of 
increased computational resources. In the first of these questions, participants were shown a plot 
from recent research at OpenAI (Amodei and Hernandez 2018). It is a semi-log plot of 
computational costs of training for a number of AI milestones over the previous six years. It reveals 
a doubling in training costs every 3.5 months. Participants were then asked to give a probability 
of this trend continuing for five years and ten years. The second question asked participants how 
much they expected AI progress to speed up if researchers were all given access to unlimited 
computational resources. 
                                               
7 A thorough discussion of respondents’ comments will be included in forthcoming work. This will also explore the 
interviews conducted concurrently with the survey based on the same questions.  
8 We do not envision a broadly capable AI system as being feasible for only 50% of human tasks. 
Müller and Bostrom fixed the maximum forecast at 5,000 years and also offered participants an 
option of never (Müller and Bostrom 2016). For this survey, we left the questions open-ended, but 
during analysis we also applied the 5,000-year threshold and classified answers above this 
threshold as indicative of never. Other inconsistencies included values misordered forecasts and 
blank entries9. The frequency of these cases is reported in the results, but such answers could not 
be analyzed numerically and were thus discarded for further analysis. Of those who completed the 
survey, 119 comments were left by 54 participants10.  
 
Results 
Fixed Years Human Tasks 
The first of the human tasks related questions asked for estimations of the feasibility of automating 
human tasks at fixed years; first for the present, then for five years and then for ten years. The data 
from the three parts of this question is presented in Figure 1a and Figure 1b. Participants were 
asked only for point estimates in these questions. Consequently, only descriptive statistics are 
reported. Figure 1a depicts histograms for responses on the percentage of human tasks feasible to 
be automated now, in five years and in ten years. Figure 1b depicts box plots for the same. The 
median percentage of tasks feasible for automation now is 21.5%. This increases to 40.0% in five 
years and 60.0% in 10 years. 
 
Figure 1: left – a) histograms for responses on human tasks feasibly automatable now, in five years and in ten years; 
right – b) box plots for responses on human tasks feasibly automatable now, in five years and in ten years. 
 
Forecasts 
The next five questions concern forecasts for five different transformative AI scenarios. The 
median, mean and median aggregate forecast values for 10%, 50% and 90% probabilities can be 
seen in Table I for each of the five scenarios. Data from individual forecasts was fit to a gamma 
distribution using least squares (Grace, Salvatier et al. 2018). Numerous techniques exist for 
aggregation of probability distributions collected via elicitation of expert opinion (Clemen and 
                                               
9 An answer for each question was required to proceed through the survey. However, some participants exploited the 
fact that only one answer to each question was sufficient to proceed despite questions requiring multi-part answers. 
10 This information is of interest and will be addressed in forthcoming work – see also footnote 5. 
Winkler 1999). Here, we used a median aggregation technique (Hora, Fransen et al. 2013) that has 
recently been shown to have advantages over the more common quantile aggregation (Vincent 
1912). Each of the aggregate forecasts is shown in Figure 2a. Figure 2b depicts a comparison of 
aggregate forecasts from HLAI attendees and ICML/IJCAI attendees for a 99% broadly capable 
system. 
 
Table I: Median, Mean and Median Aggregate Forecast Results 
  System Type 
 
Probability 50% Narrow 
90% 
Narrow 
90% 
Broad 
99% 
Narrow 
99% 
Broad 
Median 
10% 5 10 15 25 30 
50% 10 25 32.5 50 50 
90% 28.5 50 60 99 100 
Mean 
10% 8.567 33.65 27.88 41.79 57.75 
50% 21.99 65.24 60.58 78.10 106.2 
90% 75.44 184.2 146.4 174.8 218.7 
Median 
Aggregate 
Forecast 
10% 3.357 10.15 16.07 22.09 28.31 
50% 11.63 24.76 33.16 50.42 56.46 
90% 28.36 49.42 59.54 96.63 99.13 
 
 
 
Figure 2: left – a) a plot comparing the five aggregate forecasts for each of the transformative AI scenarios of interest; 
right – b) a plot comparing the aggregate forecasts for the HLAI conference and the ICML and IJCAI conferences 
 
Of the 164 completed responses, 15 participants gave at least one response that, using the criterion 
cited earlier (i.e., forecasts of more than 5,000 years), was taken as indication that they believed 
this scenario would never happen. For both of the 99% scenarios all 15 participants indicated never 
to be a possibility, with 8, 6 and 5 indicating it to be a possibility for 90% broadly capable, 90% 
narrow and 50% narrow systems, respectively. In the comment box, some participants indicated 
that their extreme responses were intended to mean that this scenario would never happen or was 
not possible. For at least one scenario, 7 more of the 164 completed surveys exhibited 
inconsistencies (as discussed previously) that precluded further analysis. However, all completed 
expert surveys were considered for each individual question, and data was only disregarded if it 
deemed unsuitable for analysis of that question. 
Figures 3a and 3b depict comparisons of all narrow system forecasts and both broadly capable 
system forecasts, respectively. These figures include a colored in region indicating a 95% 
confidence interval. The 95% confidence intervals were computed for each scenario using 
bootstrapping (Efron and Tibshirani 1994), with n equal to 10,000.  These plots illustrate experts’ 
perceived timelines for increasing levels of transformative societal change due to AI progress over 
the next century. 
 
Figure 3: left – a) A plot of the aggregate forecasts for all narrow AI systems that includes 95% confidence intervals;  
right – b) A plot of the aggregate forecasts for both broad AI systems that includes 95% confidence intervals 
 
Statistical Analysis 
A multivariate regression model was used to test the impact of occupational role, region of 
residency, conference of attendance and gender. Six occupational roles were selected because they 
were indicative of different types of AI expertise and experience; these roles were graduate student, 
academic, researcher, engineer, executive and founder. 7 of the 164 respondents who completed 
the survey did not fall into any of the categories. Their roles included human resources, sales, 
journalist, etc. These seven respondents were considered to be non-experts and their data was 
discarded. Rather than looking at respondents’ country of origin (Grace, Salvatier et al. 2018), we 
considered respondents’ current region of residency (i.e., continent). For this, Africa, South 
America, Oceania and respondents of undetermined regions were all grouped into a single 
category. 
Due to the presence of multiple independent variables and covariance, the seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) model (Zellner 1962) was used. SUR is a more efficient version of ordinary 
least square (OLS) for multiple equation systems; the potential correlation among the errors 
(𝜀"#$%&' and 𝜀(')#*+&%'+,) can be accounted for by using the SUR. When the error terms I the set 
of equations are uncorrelated, the model reduces to a set of OLS regression estimates (Green 2000). 
We selected the log of the median forecast, denoted Ym, as the first dependent variable. Then, rather 
than using the 10% and 90% forecasts as separate dependent variables, we combined them into a 
measure of uncertainty, Yu, by subtracting the 10% forecast from the 90% forecast and taking the 
log. These values and the regression model can be seen in equations 1-4, where F is the raw 
forecast value input by the respondent. The five regression models were fit using the R package 
systemfit for estimating systems of simultaneous equations (Henningsen and Hamann 2007). The 
results can be seen in Table II. Results for Ym are shown in the upper half of the table while results 
for Yu are shown in the bottom half of the table. The results that were found to be statistically 
significant are highlighted with shades of grey to indicate the level of significance (a key is located 
at the bottom of the table). The p-values that were found to be statistically significant for both 
dependent variables are italicized.  
 
    𝑌" = log	(𝐹56%)             (1) 
          	𝑌( = log(𝐹96% − 𝐹;6%)          (2) 
             𝑌" = 𝛽6 + 𝛽;:5𝑋*@A# + 𝛽B:C𝑋*#D%@' + 𝛽9𝑋)@'E#*#')# + 𝛽;6𝑋D#'$#* + 𝜀"#$%&'             (3) 
          𝑌( = 𝛽6 + 𝛽;:5F 𝑋*@A# + 𝛽B:CF 𝑋*#D%@' + 𝛽9F𝑋)@'E#*#')# + 𝛽;6F 𝑋D#'$#* + 𝜀(')#*+&%'+,           (4) 
 
Table II: Results from the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions Model 
  System Type 
  50% narrow 90% narrow 90% broad 99% narrow 99% broad 
  𝛽 p 𝛽 p 𝛽 p 𝛽 p 𝛽 p 
Ym 
Student 0.697 0.093 0.266 0.542 0.503 0.190 0.130 0.755 0.082 0.851 
Academic 0.480 0.248 0.023 0.958 0.312 0.417 -0.050 0.904 -0.087 0.841 
Research 0.729 0.070 0.232 0.580 0.382 0.301 -0.085 0.831 -0.095 0.820 
Engineer 0.606 0.153 0.435 0.329 0.517 0.187 -0.152 0.724 -0.107 0.812 
Executive 0.160 0.732 0.518 0.296 0.538 0.216 -0.035 0.942 0.228 0.642 
Europe -0.041 0.887 0.070 0.817 0.157 0.566 -0.594 0.042 -0.498 0.102 
NA -0.177 0.578 -0.270 0.426 -0.096 0.753 -0.674 0.041 -0.668 0.052 
Aisa 0.240 0.488 0.342 0.356 0.523 0.108 -0.259 0.456 -0.154 0.670 
HLAI -0.378 0.061 -0.676 0.002 -0.687 0.000 -0.624 0.002 -0.774 0.000 
Female -0.392 0.166 -0.061 0.843 -0.490 0.079 -0.259 0.379 -0.367 0.233 
Yu 
Student 0.877 0.101 0.129 0.808 0.320 0.518 0.227 0.677 0.317 0.570 
Academic 0.610 0.254 -0.014 0.979 0.071 0.887 -0.043 0.937 0.044 0.937 
Research 1.003 0.053 0.320 0.532 0.318 0.506 0.381 0.467 0.438 0.414 
Engineer 0.969 0.077 0.309 0.570 0.411 0.416 -0.227 0.687 -0.044 0.939 
Executive 0.602 0.318 0.173 0.775 0.297 0.596 0.152 0.809 0.437 0.488 
Europe 0.067 0.857 0.090 0.808 0.196 0.579 -0.414 0.277 -0.485 0.214 
NA -0.063 0.877 0.053 0.899 0.062 0.876 -0.375 0.380 -0.528 0.229 
Aisa 0.755 0.092 0.927 0.042 0.966 0.023 0.128 0.778 0.051 0.913 
HLAI -0.527 0.043 -0.855 0.001 -0.705 0.004 -0.624 0.019 -0.758 0.005 
Female -0.324 0.372 -0.323 0.389 -0.618 0.087 -0.268 0.485 -0.559 0.157 
 Significance 0 0.1 0.05 0.01 0.005 
 
Naïve Calibration  
Not all of the calibration questions can be evaluated at this time, however, an alternate technique 
for utilizing the calibration questions was employed. We call this very simple technique naïve 
calibration. It is founded on the assumption that any forecast with absolute certainty, i.e. 0% or 
100%, is fundamentally flawed unless the forecaster has inside information. There is inherent 
uncertainty in any forecasts about the future, and the naïve calibration technique simply separates 
individuals who gave forecasts of absolute certainty in any one of the calibration questions from 
the remainder of the sample. A total of 41 of the 157 experts who completed the survey made at 
least one forecast of absolute certainty in the calibration questions. The SUR model was run again 
using the naïve calibration as a dummy variable. The results are shown in Table III. 
Table III: Results from the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions Model w/ Naïve Calibration 
  System Type 
  50% narrow 90% narrow 90% broad 99% narrow 99% broad 
  β p β p β p  β p β p 
Ym 
Student 0.746 0.072 0.292 0.507 0.539 0.164 0.176 0.673 0.134 0.759 
Academic 0.513 0.214 0.040 0.928 0.320 0.408 -0.051 0.903 -0.098 0.823 
Research 0.817 0.042 0.277 0.513 0.429 0.251 -0.031 0.939 -0.043 0.918 
Engineer 0.619 0.141 0.439 0.326 0.527 0.180 -0.142 0.741 -0.097 0.829 
Executive 0.184 0.695 0.532 0.287 0.567 0.196 0.022 0.963 0.292 0.555 
Europe 0.007 0.982 0.094 0.760 0.195 0.483 -0.541 0.067 -0.436 0.156 
NA -0.156 0.627 -0.258 0.451 -0.072 0.816 -0.639 0.053 -0.623 0.071 
Aisa 0.254 0.461 0.348 0.349 0.535 0.102 -0.247 0.477 -0.141 0.697 
HLAI -0.317 0.116 -0.645 0.003 -0.654 0.001 -0.586 0.005 -0.737 0.001 
Female -0.397 0.164 -0.066 0.834 -0.516 0.070 -0.305 0.308 -0.430 0.169 
Calibration -0.026 0.947 -0.001 0.995 0.067 0.680 0.143 0.434 0.212 0.265 
Yu 
Student 0.967 0.072 0.204 0.702 0.423 0.390 0.347 0.517 0.455 0.403 
Academic 0.632 0.237 -0.009 0.987 0.054 0.912 -0.074 0.890 0.006 0.991 
Research 1.110 0.033 0.401 0.437 0.416 0.381 0.500 0.332 0.567 0.280 
Engineer 0.991 0.070 0.333 0.540 0.452 0.366 -0.206 0.708 -0.019 0.972 
Executive 0.695 0.253 0.242 0.690 0.408 0.463 0.332 0.591 0.614 0.319 
Europe 0.154 0.682 0.166 0.658 0.318 0.369 -0.265 0.481 -0.318 0.404 
NA 0.017 0.967 0.106 0.799 0.152 0.699 -0.269 0.521 -0.406 0.343 
Aisa 0.787 0.079 0.935 0.040 1.008 0.016 0.156 0.725 0.085 0.850 
HLAI -0.470 0.073 -0.797 0.003 -0.636 0.009 -0.542 0.039 -0.665 0.013 
Female -0.389 0.292 -0.387 0.310 -0.739 0.042 -0.425 0.267 -0.739 0.058 
Calibration 0.413 0.421 0.186 0.415 0.371 0.074 0.508 0.031 0.609 0.011 
 Significance 0 0.1 0.05 0.010 0.0050 
 
The results depicted in Table III were obtained through the same analysis as those in Table II, only 
with the inclusion of an 11th independent variable: the dummy variable for the naïve calibration. 
Table III is organized identically for ease of comparison. Table IV depicts the R2 values for each 
of the dependent variables for each of the regressions in the SUR. The table is arranged to enable 
comparison of the R2 values with and without the Naïve calibration.  
Table IV: Comparison of R2 Values for the Original SUR and the Naïve Calibration SUR 
  R2 
  Original SUR Naïve Calibration SUR 
99% Broadly 
Capable System 
Ym 0.0751 0.0936 
Yu 0.0561 0.1143 
99% Narrow 
Systems 
Ym 0.0751 0.0621 
Yu 0.0561 0.0812 
90% Broadly 
Capable System 
Ym 0.1632 0.1519 
Yu 0.1307 0.1413 
90% Narrow 
Systems 
Ym 0.0782 0.0651 
Yu 0.1073 0.0996 
50% Narrow 
Systems 
Ym 0.0612 0.0574 
Yu 0.0961 0.0839 
 
Computational Resources 
The final questions concerned the impact of computational resources on AI progress. The results 
for these questions can be seen in Figure 4a and Figure 4b. Figure 4a shows the survival function 
for the continuation of the exponential increase identified between AI milestones and 
computational training costs (Amodei and Hernandez 2018). Figure 4b shows the results, on a 
Likert-type scale, of participants responses regarding the hypothetical rate of increase in AI 
progress if all researchers were given access to unlimited computational resources. 
 
Figure 4: left – a) the survival function for the probability of continuing exponential increases in computational resources 
associated with future AI milestones; right – b) response totals for how much AI research will increase if everyone was 
given access to unlimited computational resources. 
 
Discussion 
Fixed Years Human Tasks 
The results for the fixed years human tasks questions, depicted in Figures 1a and 1b, indicate that 
experts believe a large number of human tasks are already automatable, and that this number will 
grow substantially over the next five to ten years. Specifically, the median percentage of human 
tasks believed to be automatable now is 21.5%, and this number increases to 40% and 60% in five 
and ten years, respectively. However, the distributions for responses to this question cover the 
entire range of possibilities, which indicates significant variance and minimal value for 
quantitative forecasting. Despite this, it is noteworthy to observe in Figure 1a that the first two 
distributions are positive skewed while the last distribution is negative skewed. This shift suggests 
some sort of consensus toward transformative progress in automation of human tasks over the 
coming decade. 
Forecasts 
The survey reported here offers a reframing of the problem of forecasting AI progress with respect 
to previous studies by developing forecasts for five unique transformative AI scenarios. Some of 
these scenarios were intended to be similar to CAIS while others were intended to more closely 
approximate notions of AGI. We see this as addressing a limitation of previous studies. Significant 
AI progress and societal transformation could affect future progress profoundly through complex 
mechanisms (Gruetzemacher 2018). Thus, forecasts for more imminent and comprehensible 
scenarios of transformative AI progress are not only prudent but necessary. It is possible that AI 
experts who work on narrow systems can forecast requisite technologies for more extreme 
transformative scenarios without envisioning recursive research and development models, state 
funded efforts on the scale of the Manhattan Project or discontinuous change in the cost of 
computation. The implications of this reframing are plainly illustrated in Figures 3a and 3b, which 
compare the narrow and broad forecasts for the different transformative AI scenarios explored 
here. Thinking of these scenarios as levels of transformative AI, we see that the lower levels of 
narrow transformative AI have the earliest timelines and the least uncertainty.   
Statistical Analysis 
We incorporated all dependent variables into a multivariate model by combining the median 
forecast and the uncertainty. We conducted a Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan 1979) for 
each of the scenarios, and one indicated the presence of heteroscedasticity. However, it is 
important to note that when the Breusch-Pagan test fails, the SUR model simply becomes separated 
OLS models because the separate modeling approach is a special case of the multivariate modeling 
approach. Thus, it is suitable to use SUR in all cases. 
It can be seen in Table II that all of the p-values reported for HLAI are italicized indicating that, 
for each scenario, the impact of both the median and the uncertainty on the model was found to be 
statistically significant. These results show particularly strong statistical significance for the HLAI 
forecasts of scenarios for all systems of 90% and above. It can also be seen that the β coefficients 
for HLAI forecasts are negative for both the median and uncertainty over all scenarios. This 
indicates that HLAI participants expect all scenarios to happen sooner than participants of the other 
conferences. Furthermore, it indicates that HLAI participants have less uncertainty in their 
forecasts than participants of the other conferences. The forecasts for a 99% broadly capable 
system for participants of HLAI and ICML/IJCAI are depicted for comparison in Figure 2b. 
Other paired correlations of interest (also italicized in Table II) include researcher’s 50% narrow 
systems forecasts and females 90% narrow systems forecasts. The statistical significance is weak, 
but, limiting factors like female sample size (7) or the challenges of coding the roles of AI experts 
may obscure other underlying correlations. Also of interest are unpaired correlations for region of 
residence as well as for occupational role in forecasts of 50% narrow systems.  
Naïve Calibration 
The inclusion of the dummy variable created for the naïve calibration technique slightly reduced 
the p-values for the HLAI participants, however, the β coefficients are still negative for both the 
mean and the uncertainty over all scenarios. Despite this it is apparent by considering Table IV 
that the naïve calibration did have a significant effect on the model. The most significant effects 
can be seen for the case of the 99% broadly capable system forecasts, where the R2 value increases 
for both the median and uncertainty. This indicates that the inclusion of the naïve calibration 
dummy variable increases the model’s explanation of the variance by 1.85% and 5.82% for the 
mean and uncertainty, respectively. However, for the other cases the inclusion of the naïve 
calibration criterion is not as easily interpreted. This could easily be explained by the different 
types of forecasts being made – the 99% broadly capable system forecast is the one expected to be 
most susceptible to forecast quality – but there are many other possible explanations as well. These 
results are ultimately inconclusive, and we suggest that future work assess the viability of this 
naïve calibration technique in a more carefully designed experiment.  
Computational Resources 
Of final interest in our discussion are the results from the computational resource questions. The 
median aggregate forecast computed using the survival function indicates a greater than 75% 
probability of the trend identified by Amodei and Hernandez (Amodei and Hernandez 2018) 
continuing for ten years. Regarding the possibility of unlimited computational resources there 
appeared to be a general consensus of a positive impact on the rate of progress in AI research, with 
51.2% of the participants indicating a rate of increase of 100% or greater. The consensus among 
researchers regarding the impact of computational resources on AI research is noteworthy and 
suggests that efforts should be made to explore expert opinion of these dynamics in future work. 
Considered with the results depicted in Figure 1, there appears to be some consensus that AI 
experts believe the next decade will continue to see AI progress proceed at a pace consistent with 
that of the past six years. 
 
Conclusions 
We have presented a set of forecasts for five scenarios of transformative AI. In sum, we conclude 
that continuing advances in AI technology should be treated as something that will have 
transformative societal impact by the end of the decade. By design, this study does not lead to any 
conclusions regarding the economic impact of this possible transformation. Rather, it is intended 
to bring attention and awareness to the public as well as policy makers that a multitude of scenarios 
exists, some of which may not be far off and may present unforeseen risks and consequences. 
Future work should examine such scenarios more closely. 
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